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Abstract
The paper studies a two-stage location-price duopoly game in a disk city with con-
sumer concentration around the city center. When consumers are uniformly dis-
tributed over the plane, unconstrained firms locate outside of the city. Consumer
concentration, however, induces firms to locate nearer to each other and, when the
degree of concentration is suﬃciently high, inside of the city. Prices and firm prof-
its decrease in the degree of consumer concentration. We explicitly solve the model
for classes of cone-shaped, dome-shaped, and bell-shaped consumer densities. In all
cases we identify a loss of welfare due to the strategic eﬀect which causes the firms’
spatial diﬀerentiation being too large.
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11 Introduction
Location is one of the most important business strategies of competing firms. On
the one hand, demand drives firms to locate close to the consumers, on the other
hand, competition acts as an incentive to locate far away from the rivals. These
countervailing forces raise the question about firms’ optimal location. Ever since
the seminal model of Hotelling (1929), the game theoretical analysis of firms’ loca-
tion choices has attracted much attention in business economics. In the tradition
of Hotelling, a large variety of strategic location-price models have emerged which
build on the concept of a one-dimensional city line. In the nowadays established
basic model, d’Aspremont et al. (1979) have shown that in a duopoly market, where
consumers have to incur a quadratic transportation cost when buying one unit of
the considered product, the two firms locate at the opposite ends of the city line.
Due to that result, the principle of maximal (spatial) diﬀerentiation was proposed.
However, as Lambertini (1994) has shown, this principle only holds if the city border
is binding. If it is not binding, the firms locate outside of the city. A shortcoming
of this important result of an unconstrained optimum is that there is no convincing
empirical evidence of such a location configuration of firms. Usually, the stores can
be found inside of the city, not outside.
This discrepancy between the theoretical prediction of the location configuration
and anecdotal empirical observation has opened a wide research agenda where the
d’Aspremont et al. (1979) and Lambertini (1994) assumptions of the basic location
model have been relaxed or generalized in several directions, thereby identifying
additional explanatory factors for location decisions. These extensions include the
number of firms (Brenner 2005), the number of outlets (Tabuchi 2012), the sequence
of entry (Tabuchi, Thisse 1995), the transportation technology (Economides 1984,
Stadler 2012), the elasticity of market demand (Böckem 1994, Woeckener 2002), un-
certainty about consumer distribution (Casado-Izaga 2000, Meagher, Zauner 2004,
2005) and - last but not least - consumer concentration around the city center (An-
derson et al. 1997, Meagher et al. 2008). In our context, the eﬀect of consumer
2concentration is of special interest because its consideration allows for the analysis
of an unconstrained interior location optimum which balances the diverging eﬀects
of consumer demand and competition.
Observing real urban areas, one rarely finds cities which can be adequately de-
scribed by a one-dimensional Hotelling line. Therefore, another strand of literature
has emerged which studies location decisions in two-dimensional space. Under the
assumption of a constrained location inside of a rectangular city, Tabuchi (1994)
and Veendorp, Majeed (1995) have shown that two firms locate at the opposite
ends of the city and argued that firms minimize their distance in one dimension but
maximize it in the other one (see Irmen and Thisse 1998 and Ansari et al. 1998 for
generalizations). A corresponding result has been derived by Mazalov and Sakaguchi
(2003) and Feldin (2012) for the alternative geometrical area of a disk city. They
conclude that the two firms locate on the disk’s perimeter, symmetrically across the
city center. Similar to the case of a one-dimensional city line, this result raises the
question regarding centripetal economic forces leading the firms to locate closer to
each other, and in particular inside of the city. Indeed, all the mechanisms at work
in the context of a Hotelling line should also influence the firms’ location strategies
on the plane.
In a promising research direction, Feldin (2012) has analyzed the location configu-
ration of three firms on the unit disk when the consumer distribution is uniform. He
was able to show that the additional third firm is suﬃcient for all competitors to
locate inside of the city. In our view, an extension of the spatial competition model
to oligopoly markets is an important step in order to improve the link between the
theoretical prediction of firms’ location decisions and the empirical evidence.
The present paper aims to generalize the disk-city model in another direction. The
focus is on consumer concentration around the city center. To keep the model an-
alytically tractable, we have to restrict the analysis to the case of two firms and
symmetric consumer densities. Since the uniform distribution is covered as a special
case, we will be able to concurrently determine the unconstrained location opti-
3mum in the basic disk-city model. We will show that, similar to the case of the
one-dimensional Hotelling line, the firms locate outside of the city. Starting with
this benchmark solution, we will study the additional demand eﬀect of consumer
concentration around the city center. In the case of a suﬃciently high degree of
demand concentration, we expect locations inside of the city.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the disk-city model
and derives the subgame perfect equilibrium of the location-price game. Some rel-
evant classes of quasi-concave consumer distributions over the disk are introduced
and applied to the model in Section 3. In Section 4, a welfare analysis, being of
interest for a regulator, is presented. An extension to an infinite city area, which
allows for a reinterpretation of geographical space in terms of horizontal product
space, is provided in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Disk-City Model
In order to study the location behavior of two firms i = 1, 2, we consider a city in
two-dimensional space where consumers with mass 1 are continuously distributed
over a unit disk. The consumer density f(r) is assumed to be polar-symmetric to
the city center such that it only depends on the radial distance r ∈ (0, 1) to the hub.
We assume that consumers have to incur a transportation cost that is quadratically
increasing in the distance to the seller firms. The consumer surplus is assumed to
be suﬃciently high such that every consumer buys one (and only one) unit of the
homogeneous good from one of the rivals. These features generally imply that the
line of indiﬀerent consumers is perpendicular to the line connecting the two firms’
locations (see, e.g., Tabuchi 1994).
Let us rotate the disk so that all symmetric firm locations have the same value
y1 = y2 = 0 on the y-axis. Then the connecting line between the firm locations is
the x-axis and the indiﬀerent consumers are located along a vertical line parallel to
the y-axis. Without loss of generality, we assume that x1 > x2, i.e., firm 1 is located
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Figure 1: Vertical line of indiﬀerent consumers at x2 < x˜ < x1
to the right. When buying from firm i = 1, 2, a consumer located at the point (x, y)
has to incur a total cost consisting of the (mill) price pi, charged by firm i, and
a transportation cost ti = y2 + (xi − x)2 which is quadratically increasing in the
Euclidean distance between the location of the consumer and the location (xi, 0)
of firm i. As is graphically shown in Figure 1, the indiﬀerent consumers are then
located along the vertical line at x˜ ∈ [x2, x1] which is derived from the consumers’
indiﬀerence condition
p1 + (x1 − x˜)2 = p2 + (x2 − x˜)2
and is determined as
x˜ = x1 + x22 +
p2 − p1
2(x2 − x1) . (1)
Neglecting costs of production, the firms’ profits are
Π1(p1, p2, x1, x2) = p1D(x˜)
Π2(p1, p2, x1, x2) = p2(1−D(x˜)) , (2)
5where the demand function of firm 1 is1
D(x˜) = 2
∫ 1
x˜
f(r) r arccos(x˜/r) dr (3)
and the demand function of firm 2 is 1−D(x˜).
We are interested in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game, where
firms i = 1, 2 strategically locate at xi in stage 1 and charge prices pi in stage 2.
It proves useful to first solve the game for a general demand function D(x˜) and
thereafter to empirically apply plausible specifications. This procedure corresponds
to the one used by Anderson et al. (1997) and Meagher et al. (2008) for the case of
a one-dimensional consumer distribution but extends it to a two-dimensional space.
In the second stage of the game, the firms maximize their profits (2) with respect
to their prices. The first-order conditions read
D(x˜) + p1D′(x˜)(dx˜/dp1) = 0
1−D(x˜)− p2D′(x˜)(dx˜/dp2) = 0 .
From (1), we obtain the derivatives dx˜/dp1 = − dx˜/dp2 = − 1/(2(x2 − x1)) and
hence the implicit price equations
p1 = 2(x2 − x1)D(x˜)/D′(x˜)
p2 = 2(x2 − x1)(1−D(x˜))/D′(x˜) . (4)
Substituting these expressions into the profit equations (2) gives
Π1(x1, x2, x˜(x1, x2)) = 2(x2 − x1)D(x˜)2/D′(x˜)
Π2(x1, x2, x˜(x1, x2)) = 2(x2 − x1)(1−D(x˜))2/D′(x˜) , (5)
1The disk area on the right side of the vertical line x˜ is 2
∫ 1
x˜
r arccos(x˜/r) dr. Multiply at each
point in this area by the local consumer density f(r) to obtain the demand function D(x˜).
6whereas the indiﬀerence condition (1) can be rewritten as
x˜(x1, x2) =
x1 + x2
2 +
1− 2D(x˜)
D′(x˜) . (6)
Totally diﬀerentiating the implicit function (6) with respect to the firms’ locations
yields
dx˜
dx1
= dx˜
dx2
= D
′(x˜)2
2[3D′(x˜)2 + (1− 2D(x˜))D′′(x˜)] . (7)
In the first stage of the game, the firms maximize their profit functions (5) with
respect to their locations xi. From the first-order conditions, we derive
D(x˜)D′(x˜)
2D′(x˜)2 −D′(x˜)D′′(x˜) = (x2 − x1)
dx˜
dx1
(1−D(x˜))D′(x˜)
2D′(x˜)2 + (1−D(x˜))D′′(x˜) = (x2 − x1)
dx˜
dx2
. (8)
Rearranging terms and using (7) yields the fundamental equation
D′′(x˜) = 1− 2D(x˜)
D(x˜)(1−D(x˜)) D
′(x˜)2 , (9)
which can be used to (numerically or even analytically) solve for x˜ in terms of the
distribution parameters of consumer concentration. Substituting (7) and (9) into (8)
gives the spatial distance between the rivals
x1 − x2 = 2(1−D(x˜) +D(x˜)2)/D′(x˜) .
By additionally taking into account the indiﬀerence equation (6), we obtain the
firms’ locations
x1 = x˜− (1−D(x˜))(2−D(x˜))/D′(x˜)
x2 = x˜+ (1 +D(x˜))D(x˜)/D′(x˜) (10)
7and from (4) and (5) the prices
p1 = 4(1−D(x˜) +D(x˜)2)D(x˜)/D′(x˜)2
p2 = 4(1−D(x˜) +D(x˜)2)(1−D(x˜))/D′(x˜)2 (11)
and profits
Π1 = 4(1−D(x˜) +D(x˜)2)D(x˜)2/D′(x˜)2
Π2 = 4(1−D′(x˜) +D(x˜2)(1−D(x˜))2/D′(x˜)2 . (12)
In the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, the indiﬀerence line goes through
the city center (x˜ = 0) so that the rivals equally share the whole market demand.
As is shown in the appendix, this implies that
D′(x˜ = 0) = −2
∫ 1
0
f(r) dr < 0 (13)
and D′′(x˜ = 0) = 0. Note that −D′(x˜ = 0) > 0 is the marginal density of the
two-dimensional consumer distribution along the x˜ = 0-line through the city center.
Then it follows from (10), (11), and (12), that in the subgame perfect equilibrium
the firms locate at
x∗1 = −x∗2 = −3/(4D′(x˜ = 0)) , (14)
charge the prices
p∗ = 3/(2D′(x˜ = 0)2) , (15)
and realize the profits
Π∗ = 3/(4D′(x˜ = 0)2) . (16)
These equations are the two-dimensional counterparts to the solution equations de-
rived by Anderson et al. (1997) for the case of a one-dimensional city. Interestingly, it
proves suﬃcient to calculate the marginal density 2
∫ 1
0 f(r) dr of the two-dimensional
consumer distribution at the city center. While Meagher et al. (2008) have presented
a toolkit for special classes of one-dimensional consumer densities, we intend to pro-
vide explicit solutions for some two-dimensional classes of consumer distributions.
83 Classes of Feasible Distribution Functions
Since the mass of consumers is normalized to one, all feasible consumer densities at
the distance r from the center with angle ϕ are restricted to∫ 2pi
0
∫ 1
0
rf(r, ϕ) dr dϕ = 1 .
In the special case of polar symmetry, this feasibility condition simplifies to
2pi
∫ 1
0
rf(r) dr = 1 . (17)
Now we are ready to apply some empirically plausible quasi-concave consumer den-
sities f(r) with the property f ′(r) < 0 in order to study the impact of consumer
concentration around the city center on the location policy of firms. The class of
cone-shaped distributions satisfying the feasibility condition (17) is characterized by
density functions of the type
f(r) = 1/pi + α(2/3− r) ,
where α ∈ [0, 3/pi] is an appropriate measure of the degree of consumer concentration
around the city center.2 Substituting
∫ 1
0 f(r) dr = 1/pi + α/6 into (13) gives
D′(x˜ = 0) = −2/pi − α/3 .
Given this expression, the equations (14) to (16) imply the firms’ location decisions
x∗1 = −x∗2 =
9pi
4(6 + αpi)
and price decisions
p∗ = 32(2/pi + α/3)2 ,
2This is a two-dimensional extension inter alia of the triangular density function as used by
Tabuchi, Thisse (1995). A corresponding specification can be found in Mazalov and Sakaguchi
(2003).
9leading to the profits
Π∗ = 34(2/pi + α/3)2 .
Table 1 summarizes the results for some numerical values of the degree of consumer
concentration α.
Table 1: Results for the location-price game with cone-shaped consumer
concentration
x∗1 p
∗ Π∗
α = 0 1.178 3.701 1.851
α = 0.340 1.000 2.667 1.333
α = 0.955 0.785 1.645 0.822
In the limit case of α = 0, the consumer distribution over the city is uniform, i.e.,
f(r) = 1/pi. This implies the equilibrium locations x∗1 = −x∗2 = (3/8)pi ≈ 1.178
outside of the city, prices p∗ = (3/8)pi2 ≈ 3.701, and profits Π∗ = (3/16)pi2 ≈ 1.851.3
The reason for locating outside of the city is the strategic eﬀect that forces firms to
suﬃciently distance themselves in order to avoid a unilateral price deviation from the
equilibrium. For intermediate degrees of concentration α ∈ (0, 3/pi), the consumer
distribution looks like a “marquee with open sides.” The spatial distance of the firms,
the prices, and the profits are all decreasing in the distribution parameter α. The
centrifugal strategic eﬀect of spatial diﬀerentiation is still at work, but the centripetal
demand eﬀect of a high consumer concentration around the city center induces firms
to move closer to each other so that the intensity of competition increases, leading
to a decline in profits. The concentration value of α = 3(3pi − 8)/(4pi) ≈ 0.34
3If the city border is binding, firms locate on the disk’s perimeter at maximal distance. Substi-
tuting x1 = −x2 = 1, D(x˜ = 0) = 1/2, and D′(x˜ = 0) = −2/pi into the price equations (4) shows
that the firms charge the prices p = pi < p∗ and hence realize the profits Π = (1/2)pi < Π∗. This
solution is the constrained optimum as it was derived by Mazalov, Sakaguchi (2003) and Feldin
(2012).
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captures the setting where both firms locate exactly on the border of the city, i.e.,
at the ends of the horizontal diameter. When the degree of consumer concentration
α is higher than this value, firms locate inside of the city. Finally, the limit case
of α = 3/pi ≈ 0.955 implies the density function f(r) = 3(1 − r)/pi. Consumer
concentration is highest at the city center and declines to zero when approaching
the outskirts of the city. Firms locate at x∗1 = −x∗2 = (1/4)pi ≈ 0.785, charge the
prices p∗ = (1/6)pi2 ≈ 1.645 and realize the profits Π∗ = (1/12)pi2 ≈ 0.822.
Due to the upper limit α = 3/pi of the distribution parameter, the cone-shaped den-
sity does not allow for an analysis of even more concentration, including the extreme
case of a point distribution at the city center. This requires more flexible density
functions. The desire to cover the whole range of consumer concentration motivated
us to investigate another class of distributions by adapting the beta distribution
to the two dimensions of the considered unit disk.4 The polar-symmetric density
functions that satisfy the feasibility condition (17) read
f(r) = (β + 1)(1− r2)β/pi ,
where β ∈ [0,∞] measures the degree of consumer concentration. For small param-
eter values 0 < β ≤ 1, the consumer distribution is concave and looks like a “dome”
with its maximum at the city center. For higher values 1 < β < ∞, the distri-
bution has a concave-convex shape with a ring of inflection points at the distance
r = 1/
√
2β − 1 from the city center and looks like a “bell.”
We calculate
∫ 1
0 f(r) dr = Γ(β+2)/[2
√
piΓ(β+3/2)], where Γ is the gamma function5,
and insert the expression into (13) to obtain
D′(x˜) = − Γ(β + 2)√
pi Γ(β + 3/2) .
4This is a two-dimensional counterpart to the one-dimensional beta density function as used by
Stadler (2012).
5Note that Γ(1/2) =
√
pi, Γ(1) = 1, and Γ(n+ 1) = nΓ(n) for n = {1/2, 1}.
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Then we derive from the equations (14) to (16) the firms’ location decisions
x∗1 = −x∗2 =
3
√
pi
4
Γ(β + 3/2)
Γ(β + 2) ,
the price decisions
p∗ = 3pi2
(
Γ(β + 3/2)
Γ(β + 2)
)2
,
and hence the profits
Π∗ = 3pi4
(
Γ(β + 3/2)
Γ(β + 2)
)2
.
The limit case of β = 0 once again describes the uniform distribution with the
consumer density f(r) = 1/pi as a benchmark. The spatial distance of the firms, the
prices and profits are all decreasing in the degree of consumer concentration β. As
before, the centripetal demand eﬀect of a high consumer concentration around the
city induces firms to move closer to each other so that the intensity of competition
gets fiercer, leading to declining profits.
The intermediate case of β = 1/2 captures the setting where both firms locate
exactly on the border of the city. Higher degrees of consumer concentration induce
firms to locate inside of the city. When β approaches infinity, the consumer density
converges to a mass point at the hub. The demand eﬀect forces firms to locate back
to back at the city center. Bertrand competition drives prices down to the unit
production costs (which are normalized to zero) and no profits are left to the rivals.
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Table 2: Results for the location-price game with dome-shaped and bell-shaped
consumer concentration
x∗1 p
∗ Π∗
β = 0 1.178 3.701 1.851
β = 1/2 1.000 2.667 1.333
β = 1 0.982 2.570 1.285
β = 2 0.859 1.968 0.984
β = 3 0.773 1.594 0.797
β →∞ 0.000 0.000 0.000
The analysis of the centripetal force of demand concentration gives us the firms’
unique equilibrium distances from the city center. The locations themselves, how-
ever, are not unique. Due to a rotation of the disk, infinitely many equivalent location
equilibria exist. This means that the firms must somehow coordinate on one main
axis through the city center. Unfortunately, this multiplicity problem cannot be re-
solved within the model. Instead, one would have to take into account additional
considerations such as the location of adjacent cities in order to fix the main axis.
4 Socially Optimal Location
A regulator (such as the mayor and the city council), concerned with the surplus of
the two firms as well as with that of all consumers in the market, aims to minimize
the total transportation cost. In a symmetric configuration, each firm covers half
of the market demand. To derive the socially optimal spatial diﬀerentiation, we
consider the first quadrant of the unit disk. Here it proves useful to apply the polar
coordinates x = r cosϕ and y = r sinϕ as shown in Figure 2. A consumer located
at the distance r from the center with angle ϕ has to incur the transportation cost
t1(r, ϕ, x¯1) = (r sinϕ)2 + (x¯1 − r cosϕ)2 = x¯21 + r2 − 2rx¯1cosϕ ,
13
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Figure 2: Consumer location and the transportation distance to firm 1
when buying from firm 1 located at x¯1. The total transportation cost of all consumers
adds up to6
T = 4
∫ pi/2
0
∫ 1
0
(
x¯21 + r2 − 2rx¯1cosϕ
)
f(r) r dr dϕ .
In the case of the cone-shaped densities f(r) = 1/pi + α(2/3− r), we obtain
T =
∫ pi/2
0
( 2
pi
x¯21 −
24− 2αpi
9pi x¯1cosϕ+
15− 2αpi
15pi
)
dϕ
= x¯21 −
24− 2αpi
9pi x¯1 +
15− 2αpi
30 .
Minimizing of this cost with respect to the location x¯1 gives the first-order condition
x¯1 = −x¯2 = (12− αpi)/(9pi) .
6Note that the tiny area diﬀerential dA for the polar coordinates (r, ϕ) is dA = r dr dϕ.
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Table 3: Comparison of equilibrium and socially optimal locations in the case of
cone-shaped densities of consumer concentration
α 0 0.340 0.955
x∗1 1.178 1.000 0.785
x¯1 0.424 0.387 0.318
As expected, the socially optimal spatial distance to the city center decreases in
the concentration parameter α from x¯1 = 4/(3pi) ≈ 0.424 (when α = 0) to x¯1 =
1/pi ≈ 0.318 (when α = 3/pi ≈ 0.955). It can be shown that, for all feasible values of
α, the socially optimal locations are nearer to the city center than the equilibrium
locations are. Table 3 presents the results for some special values of α.
In case of the beta densities f(r) = (β + 1)(1− r2)β/pi, we are not able to derive a
general solution. However, we can calculate explicit solutions for special values of the
degree of concentration β. The limit case of β = 0 captures the uniform distribution
and coincides with the solution x¯1 = 4/(3pi) ≈ 0.424, already derived in the case of
the cone-shaped distribution with α = 0.
The total transportation cost in the case of β = 1 is
T = (2/pi)
∫ pi/2
0
(
x¯21 − (16/15) x¯1 cosϕ+ (1/3)
)
dϕ
= (1/2)x¯21 − (8/(15pi))x¯1 + pi/6 .
Minimizing this cost with respect to the location x¯1 gives the first-order condition
x¯1 = −x¯2 = 16/(15pi) ≈ 0.340 .
The total transportation cost in case of β = 2 is
T = (3/pi)
∫ pi/2
0
(
x¯21 − (4/15)x¯1cosϕ
)
dϕ
= (1/4)x¯21 − (16/(35pi))x¯1 − 1/(8pi) .
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Minimization yields
x¯1 = −x¯2 = 32/(35pi) ≈ 0.291 .
Of course, as the degree of consumer concentration approaches infinity, the socially
optimal locations converge to the city center, i.e., x¯1 = −x¯2 = 0. Table 4 presents
the results for some special values of β.
Table 4: Comparison of equilibrium and socially optimal locations in the case of
beta densities of consumer concentration
β = 0 β = 1 β = 2 ... β →∞
x∗1 1.178 0.982 0.859 ... 0.000
x¯1 0.424 0.340 0.291 ... 0.000
The socially optimal spatial distance to the city center decreases in the concentration
parameter from x¯1 ≈ 0.424 (when β = 0) to x¯1 = 0 (when β → ∞). The socially
optimal locations are always nearer to the city center than the equilibrium locations
are. The welfare implication is that firms should be forced by the regulator to locate
nearer to the city center than they would do without such a regulation policy.
5 From Spatial to Product Diﬀerentiation
The location analysis is not restricted to the special case of a unit disk. Consider,
for example, the uniform distribution. If the area of the disk is stretched to a radius
of R > 1 or compressed to a radius R < 1, the equilibrium locations transform to
xˆ∗1 = −xˆ∗2 = Rx∗1 = −Rx∗2
and the equilibrium prices and profits transform to pˆ∗ = R2p∗ and Πˆ∗ = R2Π∗. The
larger the city area is, the greater the distance between the firms and the higher the
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prices and profits.7 For example, in the case of a uniform consumer density of 1, the
city radius takes the lower value R = 1/
√
pi ≈ 0.564, leading to the closer locations
xˆ∗1 = −xˆ∗2 = (3/8)
√
pi ≈ 0.665 and the lower prices pˆ∗ = (3/8)pi ≈ 1.178 and profits
Πˆ∗ = (3/16)
√
pi ≈ 0.589.
A radius approaching infinity allows for the application of further classes of distribu-
tion functions with infinite support. These distributions might serve as acceptable
approximations of consumer densities in real cities. However, the actual advantage
of such distributions is that they enable an appropriate analysis of firms’ strategic
product positioning in a two-dimensional product space.8
As is well known, models of spatial diﬀerentiation on the plane can equivalently be
treated as models of horizontal diﬀerentiation in a two-dimensional product space.
All that is necessary is to reinterpret the spatial consumer location in terms of
their preferences for alternative product attributes and their transportation cost
in terms of a loss of utility due to the fact that they are not able to buy the
product with the most preferred attributes. In this modified interpretation of a
positioning-price game, the firms i = 1, 2 produce the heterogeneous goods 1 and 2
such that product diﬀerentiation and the degree of heterogeneity is endogenized by
the strategic (brand) positioning of the firms.
As an important example, let us consider the two-dimensional normal distribution
with means zero and independent variances σ2 which is described by the density
function
f(r) = 12pi σ2 e
−(1/2)r2/σ2 .
7Additionally, the population of the city - an alternative measure of the “city size” - does not
have to be restricted to the mass of 1. An increasing mass would leave the location and price
decisions of the firms unchanged but would proportionally increase their profits.
8In case of finite support, a rectangular (or a quadratic) product space would certainly be
preferable to a disk space. A quadratic product space, however, is not tractable for an analysis of
demand concentration since the property of polar-symmetry is not satisfied. In the case of infinite
support, the geometrical diﬀerence between a disk and a square diminishes such that this problem
is resolved.
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This distribution implies polar-symmetric demand concentration around the modal
consumer preference.9 The marginal density of the demand distribution (13) can be
calculated as
D′(x˜ = 0) = − 2
∫ ∞
0
1
2pi σ2 e
−(1/2)r2/σ2dr = −
∫ ∞
−∞
1
2pi σ2 e
−(1/2)r2/σ2dr = − 1√
2pi σ
.
Then it follows from (14), (15), and (16), that the firms locate at
x∗1 = −x∗2 =
3
√
pi σ
2
√
2
≈ 1.88 σ ,
charge the prices
p∗ = 3piσ2 ≈ 9.425 σ2 ,
and realize the profits
Π∗ = (3/2)piσ2 ≈ 4.712 σ2 .
Due to the special properties of the normal distribution, this equilibrium solution of
the positioning-price game coincides with that of a one-dimensional (product) space
(see Meagher et al. 2008). The variance σ2 clearly serves as an inverse measure of
demand concentration. As in the case of a disk, demand concentration induces firms
to position the attributes of their products nearer to each other even if this causes
declining prices and profits. In the limit case of maximum demand concentration
(σ2 → 0), product diﬀerentiation and hence market heterogeneity entirely vanish.
As a consequence, Bertrand competition drives the prices down to the (zero) unit
production costs and profits decline to zero.
9As pointed out e.g. by Ansari et al. (1994), the distribution of consumer preferences in many
markets is unlikely to be uniform.
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6 Conclusion
Consumer demand is usually concentrated around the centers of cities. Even if strate-
gic eﬀects of location induce firms to locate far away from each other, this demand
eﬀect stimulates firms to move towards the city center and thus closer to each other.
The combination of a two-dimensional city area, perhaps best described by a disk
model, and a non-uniform consumer distribution with concentration around the city
center can explain the firms’ location strategies in a rather satisfying way. In partic-
ular, it can be shown that in such an environment even duopolistic firms are likely
to locate inside of the city when the degree of consumer concentration is suﬃciently
high. When the radius of the disk approaches infinity, the model of spatial diﬀer-
entiation can be reinterpreted in terms horizontal product diﬀerentiation. In this
setting, it is the modal concentration of consumer preferences that induces firms to
position the product attributes close to each other.
Of course, an interesting extension of the model would be the analysis of an oligopoly
market with more than two firms. However, even in the case of uniform distribu-
tions, the theoretical analysis of oligopolistic competition in geographical or product
space proves to be very complex. An alternative is to apply techniques of numerical
simulation. On the one hand, such methods enable the search for unique or multiple
location equilibria of oligopolies, even with non-uniform consumer densities. On the
other hand, explicit solutions impose consistency on the theoretical thinking regard-
ing the strategic interaction of firms. The present paper should be seen as a small
piece in the mosaic of this broad framework.
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7 Appendix
As described in the main text, the demand function of firm 1 reads
D(x˜) = 2
∫ 1
x˜
f(r) r arccos(x˜/r) dr (A.1)
and the demand of firm 2 is 1 − D(x˜). By using Leibniz’s rule and integrating by
parts, we obtain the derivatives
D′(x˜) = −2
∫ 1
x˜
f(r)√
1− (x˜/r)2
dr
= −2
[
f(1)
√
1− x˜2 −
∫ 1
x˜
f ′(r)
√
r2 − x˜2 dr
]
(A.2)
and
D′′(x˜) = 2x˜
[
f(1)√
1− x˜2 −
∫ 1
x˜
f ′(r)√
r2 − x˜2 dr
]
. (A.3)
In the case of x˜ = 0 (symmetric firm location around the city center), one obtains10
D(x˜ = 0) = 1/2 . (A.1’)
The first two derivatives amount to
D′(x˜ = 0) = −2
∫ 1
0
f(r) dr < 0 (A.2’)
and
D′′(x˜ = 0) = 0 . (A.3’)
10Note that arccos(0) = pi/2 and 2pi
∫ 1
0 rf(r) dr = 1 for all feasible polar-symmetric consumer
densities.
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